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Who Speaks for Palestine? The Political Struggle for Gaza
Adam Maust, Roger Williams University
Mark Sawoski, Professor of International Relations (editor)
The struggle for Palestinian power is likely to reach a new, higher level when Israel withdraws
from Gaza and Israel completes the security fence separating it from Palestinians from living in
the West Bank.

The struggle is apparent in recent power play moves in the Gaza between Mohammad Dahlan
(former Palestinian Authority [PA] security chief in Gaza) and General Jabril Rajoub (the PA’s
current national security advisor). In February, 2004, notably, armed agents of the PA’s
Preventive Security Service (PSS), apparently acting on behalf of Dahlan, stormed the Gaza City
headquarters of the Palestinian police and beat up Major General Ghazi al-Jabali, the police
commander and an associate of Rajoub who was personally appointed by Arafat. Reportedly, a
meeting between Dahlan’s people and Jabali went bad. Jabali was hurt so badly that he was
hospitalized. Dahlan’s people could have killed Jabali with a little more effort—in this sense they
acted “with restraint.” Note that no retaliation appears to have resulted. Clearly, the PA’s
position is weakening. Similarly, in another recent incident, Khalil al-Zibann, a close Arafat
advisor was killed in downtown Gaza City. This, again, exemplifies the challenge Arafat faces is
not unexpected. It is not confined to Gaza. In December 2003, a study team composed of former
heads of Israeli security organizations predicted that Arafat would soon lose what control he has
in territories, leaving a power vacuum. “What we’ll see is a lot of small areas of control and
influence,” said Shmuel Bar, chairman of the study team. “It will be warlords with their own
armed forces.”1

“It is true, anarchy is taking over and it’s a shame,” Rajoub says of recent developments in the
Gaza.2 Maybe; or might a better description be that Arafat and the PA are simply being pushed
out of the Gaza? An Israeli withdrawal from Gaza will create a vacuum. So much so that
Palestine Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia has requested UN peacekeeping forces be deployed to
the Gaza Strip when Israel withdraws (probably this July). The UN Development Program of
Assistance to the Palestinian People (UNDP/PAPP) has been in the Gaza and may be able to
format a map for economic assistance and security once the withdrawal is underway. UNDP
could be the front-runner in developing a plan for Gaza without Israeli settlements and for
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involving the international community and also the PA. The point is, without strong international
backing it is questionable whether the PA will be able to assert much authority in Gaza.

There are four main players or groups in the power struggle for Gaza: Rajoub (the PA), Dahlan,
the Tanzim militia in Gaza and Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi.

Rajoub would appear to have the least influence in the Gaza Strip out of the four individuals. His
following, and most likely area success, are in the West Bank. The rift between Dahlan and
Rajoub has already been noted. Dahlan is challenging the PA’s existence, as presently
constituted—even though he has recently made a point of emphasizing that Arafat is his leader.
Dahlan’s ire was reportedly raised four months ago when Arafat personally vetoed his
participation in the new cabinet formed by PA Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei.3 The PA’s
Preventive Security Service (PSS) in Gaza (which Dahlan recently led) are loyal to Dahlan and not
the PA. Rashid Abu Shabak, the current PSS head, is a close associate of Dahlan.

Hamas, meanwhile, in Palestinian eyes, appears to have established itself as a legitimate player in
the Gaza at least after Israel pulls out. Speaking to reporters last week after meeting with Arafat,
PA Foreign Minister Nabil Sha'ath said, "we hope this [a withdrawal] will pave the road for a
Palestinian general election with participation with Hamas."4 The suggestion that terrorists from
Hamas might be given a role in governing Gaza, if not Palestinian affairs more broadly, brought
immediate opposition from both the Sharon government and the US. Raanan Gissin, a Sharon
adviser, described it as “another effort by the Palestinian Authority to bypass the requirement to
fight terrorism." He also starkly attributed it to the current weakness of the Palestinian
Authority: "This is not Hamas joining the PA. This is the PA joining Hamas."5

Nevertheless, it seems unlikely Hamas will be kept out. Moreover, it is not clear how the
international community will deal with such an eventuality over the long term. Hamas masks
their terrorist activities by establishing schools, hospitals and communities while using their
terrorist attacks to influence what happens in the region. Roughly ninety percent of the Hamas
budget goes towards these humanitarian efforts according to Israeli sources. Indeed, Hamas’s
stated model is Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is now a parliamentary party.
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At the same time, Hamas has its own liabilities and weaknesses. Too much, in fact, should not be
made of this idea that the PA is effectively joining a strengthening Hamas. In particular, Hamas’s
popular founder, Ahmed Yassin, is now dead and is replaced by Abdel Rantissi. Yassin was able

to control and bring together all the separate entities of Hamas throughout the Gaza Strip and in
the West Bank in a way that Rantissi will not be able to match. Also, Arafat, who had Rantisi jailed
on several occasions in the past, “is known to despise him” –and he has refused to have direct
dealings with him since Yassin’s death.6 Indeed, the person who appears to be brokering
Hamas’s participation in a governing coalition for Gaza is none other than Mohammad Dahlan.
Both, it should be noted, come from the Khan Yunis refugee camp in Gaza—which is Dahlan’s
base of operations. It is said that they have “long been on good terms.”7 It would appear, then,
that Dahlan is seeking to play a major role in Gaza after the withdrawal with the help of Hamas,
not the other way around.

Hamas is also weakened by its dependence on Iran, where its support will erode as the reformist
movement gains ground.8 (For more information on Hamas, see study group paper on
Palestinian terrorist organizations.)

The fourth major player is the Tanzim militia in Gaza. The Tanzim is the armed wing of the
Fatah, the largest faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Although set up by
Arafat in the 1990s, its leadership—the popular and jailed Marwan Bargouti in particular--has
been publicly critical of the first generation leaders who were mostly absent from the territories
until Oslo; that is, they have resonance with younger Palestinians. The Tanzim acts as
paramilitary counter-balance to Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Its members are
responsible for their own acts of terror—and it has links to the Al Aqsa terrorist organization.9 In
Gaza, the Tanzim is associated with the PA's Preventive Security apparatus. Its leader, Ahmad
Chiles, is also reportedly close to Mohammad Dahlan.10 This is another reason why Dahlan is
likely to play a pivotal role in Gaza after the withdrawal.

The Palestinian Authority has been referred to as “a house of cards” being held up by Israel. In
recent polls taken in the West Bank and Gaza, according to BBC, suggest that about sixty percent
of Palestinians support suicide attacks in some degree. For Arafat this is a sign of losing control of
a very delicate situation that he has not handled well. The Palestinian Authority has lost
dominant control in the Gaza and the West Bank may be soon to follow. A sign of the PA losing

33

Volume 3
Center for Macro Projects and Diplomacy Working Paper Series
Spring 2004
______________________________________________________________________________________
authority in the West Bank would be at Birzeit University and the recent loss of the leadership of
the student government by Fatah to Hamas.

The reality of a Palestinian Gaza will create the need for new leadership other then Arafat and the
PA. Arafat, famously, is said to be more suited to underground work than to governing. An

Israeli withdrawal from Gaza will underscore this. This will result because a premium may
finally be placed on governing, or at least the ability to bring economic development to Gaza. For
this reason getting business into the Gaza becomes essential to any form of statehood and peace
for the people of Palestine. Mohammed Shtayyeh, the current director of Palestinian Council for
Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), and Ahmed Qurei, the former director of PECDAR
and now Prime Minister of Palestine, are two individuals that could accomplish this task. But so
too could Dahlan.

Perhaps most significantly, both Israel and the US have had dealings with Dahlan—and are
widely believed to favor him in the current struggle. Specifically, the Sharon Government has
avoided targeting PA security forces in Gaza.11

Grave issues are at stake. The responsibility for governing Gaza will have major political
repercussions—with a key point being that the ability to bring in foreign investment will be a big
advantage in the struggle for the Gaza, especially after Israel withdraws. This will give foreign
investors (including those proposing appropriate macro-projects) influence. It also seems to
point to a more moderate political outcome than many commentators have recently – in the wake
of the Yassin execution—forecasted; this, provided appropriate macro infrastructure projects are
on the table.
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